Game Theory Quiz 2: 3 August 2025, Set QIA2 (May 2025 term)

(Bayesian Game) Consider a two-player game in which the payoffs, which depend on $\theta$, and actions are as in the following table:

$\theta = 0$

$\theta = 1$

Where $\Pr(\theta = 0) = \Pr(\theta = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$. Player 2 knows exactly what value $\theta$ has, whereas player 1 doesn't know.

Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.

Under Bayesian Nash Eq., player 1 will play

(Bayesian Game) Consider a two-player game in which the payoffs, which depend on $\theta$, and actions are as in the following table:

$\theta = 0$

$\theta = 1$

Where $\Pr(\theta = 0) = \Pr(\theta = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$. Player 2 knows exactly what value $\theta$ has, whereas player 1 doesn't know.

Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.

Under Bayesian Nash Eq., player 2, who knows that θ = 0 will play

(Bayesian Game) Consider a two-player game in which the payoffs, which depend on $\theta$, and actions are as in the following table:

$\theta = 0$

$\theta = 1$

Where $\Pr(\theta = 0) = \Pr(\theta = 1) = \frac{1}{2}$. Player 2 knows exactly what value $\theta$ has, whereas player 1 doesn't know.

Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.

Under Bayesian Nash Eq., player 2, who knows that θ = 1 will play