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Game Theory and Strategy · Quiz 2 · 3 Aug 2025 · May 2025 term · Set QIA2

Question 11: Now assume that this game is repeated infinitely and the…

Question 11

+1 markOne correct option

Each one of two political parties can choose to buy time on commercial radio shows to broadcast negative ad campaigns against their rival. These choices are made simultaneously. Due to government regulation, it is forbidden to buy more than 2 hours of negative campaign time, so that each party cannot choose an amount of negative campaigning above 2 hours. Given a pair of choices (a1,a2), the payoff of party i is given by the following function: vi (a1,a2) = ai − 2aj + aiaj − (ai)². Write the normal form representation of this game and answer the given sub-questions.

Now assume that this game is repeated infinitely and the parties cooperate and sign a binding agreement on how much to campaign according to the Q8 & Q9.

  1. A
  2. B
  3. C
  4. D
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Correct answer

  • B
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Question 11 of 24 in the IIT Madras BS Game Theory and Strategy (Game Theory) Quiz 2 paper sat on 3 Aug 2025, in the May 2025 term (IIT M IMPROVEMENT AN EXAM QIP2 03 Aug 2025). It carries 1 mark.

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