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May 2026 term · Game Theory and Strategy · BSMS4023

Game Theory and Strategy Quiz 1: 19 July 2026 (May 2026 term)

The IIT Madras BS Game Theory and Strategy (Game Theory) Quiz 1 paper sat on 19 Jul 2026, in the May 2026 term: 16 questions for 25 marks in 120 minutes. Every question is below with its answer. Take it as a timed mock test to be marked, or read it through first.

Questions
16
Marks
25
Duration
120 min
MCQ
15
Numerical
1
Take as mock testPractise with answers

Updated

Official paper: Game Theory And Strategy 16 Jul 26 · No negative marking.

Question 1

+2 marksOne correct option
  1. A

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

  2. B

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

  3. C

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

  4. D
Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

Question 1 on its own page

Question 2

+2 marksOne correct option

Choose the incorrect statement

  1. A

    This game is a symmetric game

  2. B

    This game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium

  3. C

    Under the Nash equilibrium each player chooses P=15

  4. D

    This game has unique Nash equilibrium

Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    Under the Nash equilibrium each player chooses P=15

Question 2 on its own page

Question 3

+2 marksOne correct option

An item is up for auction. Player 1 values the item at 5 while player 2 values the item at 4. Each player can bid either 0, 1 or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins the item and pays his bid, while the loser does not pay. If both players bid the same amount, then a coin is tossed to determine who the winner is, who gets the item and pays his bid while the loser pays nothing. Formulate the game in matrix form and answer the given sub questions.

Which player does not have strictly dominated strategy?

  1. A

    Player 1

  2. B

    Player 2

  3. C

    None

Show answer

Correct answer

  • B

    Player 2

Question 3 on its own page

Question 4

+2 marksOne correct option

An item is up for auction. Player 1 values the item at 5 while player 2 values the item at 4. Each player can bid either 0, 1 or 2. If player i bids more than player j then i wins the item and pays his bid, while the loser does not pay. If both players bid the same amount, then a coin is tossed to determine who the winner is, who gets the item and pays his bid while the loser pays nothing. Formulate the game in matrix form and answer the given sub questions.

Which strategies survive Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategy?

  1. A

    (0, 0)

  2. B

    (1, 1)

  3. C

    (2, 2)

  4. D

    None

Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    (2, 2)

Question 4 on its own page

Question 5

+2 marksOne correct option

Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.

  1. A
  2. B
  3. C
  4. D
Show answer

Correct answer

  • A
Question 5 on its own page

Question 6

+2 marksOne correct option

Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.

Choose the correct alternative

  1. A

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

  2. B
  3. C

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

  4. D
Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    (A figure from the original paper is missing from the source site.)

Question 6 on its own page

Question 7

+2 marksOne correct option

This game has

  1. A

    Two Nash equilibria in pure strategy

  2. B

    A unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategy

  3. C

    Both Two Nash equilibria in pure strategy & A unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategy are true

  4. D

    None is true

Show answer

Correct answer

  • A

    Two Nash equilibria in pure strategy

Question 7 on its own page

Question 8

+3 marksNumerical answer
Show answer

Correct answer: 2

Question 8 on its own page

Question 9

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

This is a game of

  1. A

    Perfect information

  2. B

    Imperfect information

  3. C

    None

  4. D

    Can’t be determined

Show answer

Correct answer

  • A

    Perfect information

Question 9 on its own page

Question 10

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

How many terminal nodes does this game have?

  1. A

    3

  2. B

    2

  3. C

    4

  4. D

    5

Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    4

Question 10 on its own page

Question 11

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

How many information sets does this game have?

  1. A

    2

  2. B

    3

  3. C

    4

  4. D

    1

Show answer

Correct answer

  • B

    3

Question 11 on its own page

Question 12

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

How many pure strategies does player 1 have?

  1. A

    1

  2. B

    2

  3. C

    3

  4. D

    4

Show answer

Correct answer

  • D

    4

Question 12 on its own page

Question 13

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

How many pure strategies does player 2 have?

  1. A

    1

  2. B

    2

  3. C

    3

  4. D

    4

Show answer

Correct answer

  • B

    2

Question 13 on its own page

Question 14

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

How many pure strategy Nash equilibria does this game have?

  1. A

    1

  2. B

    2

  3. C

    3

  4. D

    4

Show answer

Correct answer

  • D

    4

Question 14 on its own page

Question 15

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

Which one of the Nash equilibria is also a subgame perfect equilibrium?

  1. A

    (AE, D)

  2. B

    (AF, D)

  3. C

    (BE, C)

  4. D

    (BF, C)

Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    (BE, C)

Question 15 on its own page

Question 16

+1 markOne correct option

Consider a two-player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if he chooses A while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can either choose C or D, with the game ending after C and continuing again with player 1 after D. Player 1 then can choose E or F, and then the game ends after each of these choices.
Imagine that the payoffs following choice A by player 1 are (2, 0), following C by player 2 are (3, 2), following E by player 1 are (2, 1) and following F by player 1 are (1, 2) Model this as an extensive form game and answer the given problems:

No. of sub-games this game has

  1. A

    1

  2. B

    2

  3. C

    3

  4. D

    4

Show answer

Correct answer

  • C

    3

Question 16 on its own page