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Game Theory and Strategy · End Term · 31 Aug 2025 · May 2025 term · Set QDB1

Question 5: A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has…

Question 5

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A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The worth of watch is ₹280 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹300 for the other buyer (player 3). Each buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given sub questions.

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Correct answer: 200

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Question 5 of 39 in the IIT Madras BS Game Theory and Strategy (Game Theory) End Term paper sat on 31 Aug 2025, in the May 2025 term (IIT M DEGREE AN EXAM QDB3 31 Aug 2025). It carries 0.5 marks.

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