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Game Theory and Strategy · End Term · 31 Aug 2025 · May 2025 term · Set QDB1

Question 29: Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.75 will be

Question 29

+1 markOne correct option

Five bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy answer the given sub-questions:

Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.75 will be

  1. A

    0.7

  2. B

    0.6

  3. C

    0.5

  4. D

    0.75

Show answer

Correct answer

  • B

    0.6

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Question 29 of 39 in the IIT Madras BS Game Theory and Strategy (Game Theory) End Term paper sat on 31 Aug 2025, in the May 2025 term (IIT M DEGREE AN EXAM QDB3 31 Aug 2025). It carries 1 mark.

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