Quiz Space

Game Theory and Strategy · End Term · 22 Dec 2024 · September 2024 term · Set QDB1

Question 31: VCG price for slot a will be _

Question 31

+1 markNumerical answer

Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot a has a clickthrough rate of 10 and slot b has a clickthrough rate of 5. There are three advertisers who are interested in these slots. Advertiser x values click at 3 per click, advertiser y values click at 2 per click, and advertiser z values click at 1 per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions

VCG price for slot a will be _________

Show answer

Correct answer: 15

See the whole paperTake it as a mock test

Question 31 of 38 in the IIT Madras BS Game Theory and Strategy (Game Theory) End Term paper sat on 22 Dec 2024, in the September 2024 term (IIT M DEGREE AN EXAM QDB3 22 Dec 2024). It carries 1 mark.

This question was also asked in

More questions from this paper

  1. Q1Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  2. Q2Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  3. Q3Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  4. Q4Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  5. Q5Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  6. Q6Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture and write a different consumer's utility func…
  7. Q7Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions
  8. Q8Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions
  9. Q9Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions
  10. Q10How many pure strategy equilibria are there in this game?
  11. Q11In one of these pure NEs, all three players enter the market
  12. Q12Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions
  13. Q13A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  14. Q14A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  15. Q15A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  16. Q16A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  17. Q17A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  18. Q18A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  19. Q19A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  20. Q20A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹200 and he offers it for sale…
  21. Q21What is the total probability of having the phrase “check this out” in subject line of an email?
  22. Q22What is the probability that the message is spam if subject contains the phrase “check this out”?
  23. Q23The cost to be paid by player 1 will be
  24. Q24The cost to be paid by player 2 will be _
  25. Q25The cost to be paid by player 3 will be _
  26. Q26Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.75 will be
  27. Q27The expected revenue of the seller in this auction scenario will be
  28. Q28Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions
  29. Q29Nash equilibrium of this game will be
  30. Q30Total valuation of socially optimal allocation will be
  31. Q32VCG price for slot b will be _
  32. Q33Creditor 1 with claim 400 units gets
  33. Q34Creditor 2 with claim 300 units gets
  34. Q35Suppose 5 numbers are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1] and then sorted from sma…
  35. Q36In weighted majority game [7; 5, 4, 3, 1]
  36. Q37Consider following two statements:\ Crowd can be wrong even if everyone in the crowd is rational and everyone takes the…
  37. Q38Choose the correct alternative